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BARNES V. GLEN THEATRE':
CENSORSHIP? So WHAT?
Barnes, which addressed the First Amendment protection of
live nude dancing performances, is not a case about nudity; it is
about the freedom of expression. The net effect of the decision is
to endow legislatures with greater authority to circumscribe mdivid-
ual expression. Yet, the First Amendment was adopted to prevent
any government, even a democratically elected one, from silencing
individual citizens.2 The rationale underlying the First Amendment
is that individuals as private citizens and in their relationships to
other individuals through the mechanism of representative govern-
ment will personally benefit from having as much information as
possible.3 The maximization of personal benefit, i.e., the pursuit of
happiness,4 is the logical consequence of such informational free-
dom.
Whether a commumcation triggers the linguistic, musical,
logical-mathematical, spatial or bodily-kinesthetic sectors of the
mind,' it furthers the purpose of the Free Speech Clause to pro-
mote and protect the psychologically whole individual. In Barnes,
the commumcative freedom of individuals is subjected to the
States' power to dictate a legislative majority's version of morality
Barnes, although dismissible as merely affecting nude dancing, may
have more far reaching implications because the morality justifica-
tion for speech suppression advanced therein has potentially im-
pacts a much wider variety of speech contexts.
After reviewing the procedural path of Barnes in section I,
1. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
2. See West Virgiia Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (-The
very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts."); see also Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d
1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.) (rejecting the notion that laws regulating essential-
ly moral choices are necessarily unconstitutional, -[w]e stress, because the possibility of
being misunderstood is so great, that deference to democratic choice does not apply
when the Constitution removes the choice from majorttes.-) (emphasis added); Barnes,
III S. Ct. at 2465 (Scalia, J., concurmng) (citing Dronenburg).
3. See J. E. NOwAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.6 at 835-36 (3rd ed. 1986
& Supp. 1988) (describing different theories of the value of free speech and the function
of the First Amendment); see also Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U.
PENN. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (individual self-realization is a function of free speech).
4. See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
5. See HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND (1983) (theory of multiple intelligences).
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this comment addresses the constitutional context of the decision m
section II, and m section I presents an overview of the plurality
opinion.6 Section IV aims at harmomzing the decision's most sa-
lient points with the First Amendment jurisprudence detailed m
Section II. Section V outlines Barnes potential implications m light
of the Supreme Court's perceived deference toward governments at
the expense of individual rights.
1. BACKGROUND
Indiana statute 35-45-4-1 prohibits nudity in public places.7
Respondent, Glen Theatre, is an Indiana corporation which operated
a bookstore in South Bend offering live nude performances patrons
viewed from behind a glass partition while sitting in a booth.' The
6. The decision generated a variety of opinions. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the
plurality opinion, in which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined. Justices Scalia and
Souter each filed opinions concumng in the judgment. Justice White filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stephens joined. Id at 2458. In the
interest of brevity, this essay will analyze the plurality's and Justice Souter's opinions as
compared and contrasted with the salient features of Justice White's cogent dissent. Be-
cause Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but not the essential reasoning of the
plurality, his opinion will not be analyzed for its effect on First Amendment Junspru-
dence. See generally International Eateries of America, Inc. v. Broward County, Fla., 941
F.2d 1157, 1159-61 (ilth Cir. 1991) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds.'-) (quoting in part Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977)).
7. Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1 (1988) provides:
Public Indecency
Sec. 1. (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) fondles the genitals of himself or another person;
commits public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) 'Nudity' means the showing of the human male or female
genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the
showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any
part of the nipple, or the showing of the covered male genitals in a discernibly
turgid state.
8. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (1991). The other respondent, J.R.'s
Kitty Kat Lounge, also provided live nude dancing performances, but unlike Glen Theatre,
served liquor and thus was subject to a greater degree of regulation stemming from
Indiana's exercise of its Twenty-First Amendment power. See infra note 23 and accompa-
nying text. Accordingly, the discussion will be confined to issues relating to respondent
Glen Theatre, Inc.
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owner of Glen Theatre and the dancers employed at the bookstore
challenged the public indecency statute on First Amendment
grounds, arguing that the statute was facially overbroad and that
dancing was protected expression.9 Because previous litigation had
given the statute a limiting construction, t0 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana so the statute could be challenged as applied."
Three decisions later, 2 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the public indecency statute was unconstitutional as ap-
plied because prohibition of non-obscene nude dancing performed
as entertainment in order to promote "public morality generally"
violated the First Amendment.1 3 The Umted States Supreme Court
granted certiorari14 and reversed. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, a
plurality, 5 despite acknowledging that the First Amendment pro-
tects nude dancing performances, ruled that the "Indiana statutory
requirement that the dancers in the establishment must wear pasties
and a G-string does not violate the First Amendment."
16
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Because the case involved nude dancing performed as enter-
tainment, and because, protected speech has been held to include
non-obscene 7  expressive conduct, 8  entertainment, 9  and inde-
cent sexual expression, 0 as well as nude dancing performed as
9. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 726 F. Supp. 728 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
10. See State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. 1979), appeals dismn'd sub nor.
Clark v. Indiana, 446 U.S. 931 and Dove v. Indiana, 449 U.S. 806 (1980).
I1. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287, 288-90 (7th Cir. 1986).
12. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of, South Bend, 695 F Supp. 414, 419 (N.D. Ind.
1988) (nude dancing not protected expression), revd, Miller v. Civil City of South Bend,
887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated by Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1990).
13. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Ci. 1990).
14. Ill S. Ct. 38 (1990).
15. See supra note 6.
16. Ill S. Ct. at 2460 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
17. Obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment. See Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
18. Expressive conduct is protected. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,
369 (1931) (expressive conduct in form of displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposi-
tion to organized government is free speech).
19. The First Amendment protects entertainment. See Zacclum v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (entertainment in the form of film of human
cannonball deserving of First Amendment protection); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (First Amendment prohibits censorship based on a nuisance
theory of drive-in theater film portraying nudity).
20. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
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entertainment,21 the State of Indiana's statutory ban -on nudity be-
came the object of First Amendment analysis.22 Had Glen Theatre,
Inc. also served liquor, Indiana, in its narrow role as a regulator of
the sale and consumption of alcohol, and not as a censor, may
have incidentally prohibited nude dancing under the authority of
the Twenty-First Amendment.23 Glen Theatre, Inc. did not, how-
ever, sell liquor.24
The specific type of speech involved in a case determines
what test a court will apply to a challenged statute or regulation.
In Barnes, the plurality classified nude dancing performed as enter-
tamrent as "symbolic speech., 25 Non-inherently expressive activi-
ty, such as altering or burning a flag, or sleeping in a park, will be
construed as symbolic speech, and thus will be afforded a limited
degree of First Amendment protection, if it is intended to convey a
particularized message that is likely to be understood by the receiv-
er.26 Under the test formulated in United States v. O'Bren27 and
applied in Barnes,28 a statute suppressing symbolic speech will be
upheld if: (1) it is within the government's constitutional power to
legislate in the area; (2) the restriction furthers an important gov-
("sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amend-
ment").
21. E.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) ("'[N]udity
alone' does not place otherwise protected material outside the mantle of the First Amend-
ment.").
22. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, III S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991).
23. The Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant
part: "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. See New York State Liquor
Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 715 (1981) (upholding ban on topless dancing);
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114-16 (1972) (concluding that the state's broad pow-
er to regulate liquor under the Twenty-first Amendment outweighed First Amendment
interest in nude dancing).
24. lt at 2459.
25. See id. at 2460. Chief Justice Rehnquist also referred to the dancing as "expressive
conduct." Id
26. See United States v. Eichmann, 496 U.S. 310, 316 (1990) (overturning act designed
to punish flag burning only when it communicates a message); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (acknowledging conduct as "speech" when engaged in to express an
idea); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (sleeping
in park to demonstrate plight of homeless); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11
(1974) ('[A]n intent to convey a particular message was present, and in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it.").
27. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
28. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-61.
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ernmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and, (4) if the incidental restriction
on First Amendment freedoms is "no greater than essential" to the
furtherance of the interest.29 Until Barnes, the symbolic speech
doctrine was not applied to inherently expressive activity o
The O'Brien test does not permit governments to suppress
ideas by suppressing the content of communication. It is a "bed-
rock principle underlying the First Amendment that the Gov-
ernment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." 31 If a gov-
ernment interest "blossom[s] only when a person's [conduct] com-
mumcates some message , that interest is related to the
suppression of free expression. The regulation embodying the
government's interest thus fails the third prong of O'Brien, and,
because the action involves the suppression of an idea, the O'Brien
test will not apply 33 Rather, the asserted state interest will be
subject to "the most exacting scrutiny,"'  under which the state
will have a heavy burden, content-based speech laws are presump-
tively violative of the First Amendment. 35 The Barnes dissent
alone concluded that Indiana's ban on nudity was related to the
suppression of ideas, and thus invited the application of strict scm-
tiny, i.e., traditional First Amendment analysis. 36
In addition to the O'Brien and traditional First Amendment
tests, Barnes included a discussion of a third mode of analysis, the
"time, place, or manner" ("TPM") test.37 This test is applied to
determine the constitutionality of time, place, or manner restrictions
29. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
30. See Barnes, 1II S. Ct. at 2468, 2470. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904
F.2d 1081, 1090-98 (7th Cir. 1990).
31. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (Brennan, J.).
32. Id at 410.
33. See id.
34. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
35. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 & n.7 (1980) (overturning statute mak-
ig all but labor-related picketing illegal); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95, 98-99 (1972). Under strict scrutiny, judicial or state assessment of the merits of a
specific form of expression, such as non-obscene expressive performances of the land at
issue in Barnes, is absolutely prohibited. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)
(denying state the power to "cleanse public debate"); see also City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-59 (1988) (striking down standardless licensing
scheme fostering arbitrary law enforcement); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358-62
(1983) (validating vague criminal laws creating risk of discriminatory enforcement).
36. See Barnes, ItI S. Ct. at 2473-74 (White, J., dissenting).
37. Id at 2460.
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imposed by the government on expression, "whether oral, written
or symbolized by conduct,"38 taking place in public forums such
as streets, sidewalks, and parks.39 As under O'Brien, content sup-
pression is not allowed. Restrictions may not be based upon either
the content or subject matter of speech,' and must be "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest."4'
The TPM test is stricter than the O'Brien test. A time, place,
or manner restriction which does not "leave ample alternative chan-
nels for communication" will be struck down.42  Nuisance,4 3
trespass," and zoning45  restctions have been upheld as valid
time, place, or manner regulations. Total prohibitions, however,
such as zoning ordinances banning all forms of live entertainment,
including nude dancing performances, have been struck down as
invalid time, place, or manner regulations for failing to "leave open
adequate alternative channels of communication.""
III. OVERVIEW OF THE DECISION
In Barnes, the main question presented to the Court was
whether non-obscene nude dancing performed as entertainment is
38. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
39. See Perry Educational Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983) (distinguishing (1) places devoted to assembly and debate by tradition or fiat, (2)
public property opened by the government for expressive activity, and (3) public property
neither expressly nor traditionally opened for expression); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939) (Roberts, J., concurring, joined by Black, J.) (original definition of "public forum");
NOWAK et al., supra note 3, § 16.47 at 970.
40. Madison School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167, 176 (1976).
41. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
42. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535, 536 (1980)
(emphasis added). The Barnes plurality, however, stated that the O'Brien and time, place
or manner tests "embody the same standards." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
43. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding
ordinance regulating the quality and volume of amplified sound in public parks on nut-
sance theory).
44. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99
(1984) (validating prohibition on sleeping overnight in national parks).
45. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986)
(upholding zoning ordinance dictating the concentration of "adult" theaters showing non-
obscene films); Young v. American Mint Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63 & n.18, 78-79 (1976)
(approving zoning ordinance dictating the dispersion of "adult" theaters showing non-ob-
scene films) (Powell, J., concurring).
46. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 (1981). Notice the use of
'adequate" instead of "ample" to describe the alternative that must be made available. Cf.
Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 535, 536 ("ample alternative channels").
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expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.47 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, answered yes. Having
classified the type of speech at issue, the plurality chose a test to
determine the constitutionality of Indiana's prohibition. Declining to
apply "time, place, or manner" analysis to the statute, as Indiana
requested, the plurality applied the O'Brien symbolic speech test,
which was viewed as "embodying the same standards."48 The plu-
rality49 concluded that the statute was sufficiently justified under
the four prongs of O'Brien.50
First, Indiana possessed the power to enforce the statute de-
rived from the traditional police power to provide for public mor-
als.5' Second, the statute furthered the substantial governmental
interest in protecting morals and public order.52 Third, the govern-
mental interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression
because the statute, as applied, only reached the non-communica-
tive element of the nude dancing, i.e., the nudity 53 Finally, the
plurality concluded, the incidental restrictions on First Amendment
freedoms were no greater than essential to the furtherance of the
interest because the statute was not a means to some "greater end,"
but "an end in itself."' 4 Accordingly, the First Amendment did
not prevent Indiana from enforcing its public indecency law to ban
nude dancing performances.55
47. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. CL 2456, 2471 (1991).
48. Id. at 2458; see supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. Indiana's request is
puzzling, since the "ample alternative channels of communication" element of time, place
or manner analysis could have presented a potential stumbling block in light of the fact
that the statute did not allow for any alternative channels of communication for the mes-
sage of eroticism via nudity. See infra section IV.B. Indiana's request for time, place or
manner analysis makes sense as an appeal for the extension of speech regulations to
private property in the non-zoning context. Cf City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41 (1986) (application of time, place or manner analysis to zoning ordinance
dictating location of -adult" movie theaters).- At least one decision has interpreted Barnes
as addressing the application of TPM regulations. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v.
McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 62 n.9 (3rd Cir. 1991).
49. In this regard, Justices Souter and Scalia, who wrote separate concurrng opinions,
joined the plurality.
50. Barnes, 111 S. CL at 2461-63.
51. Id. at 2462.
52. Id at 2461-62 (Justice Souter opining that Indiana's interest in preventing the
secondary effects of the nude dancing, such as crime, was a legitimate state interest under
O'Bnen's second prong).
53. Id at 2462-63.
54. Id at 2463.
55. Id at 2458, 2463.
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IV ANALYSIS
A. Conduct, The Achilles Heel of Free Expression
The plurality's solicitude towards legislatures first appeared
with its branding of the nude dancing performances as expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment, but unworthy of full
protection. Classifying the dancing as being of the "customary
'barroom' type within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment though only marginally so," '56 the plurality
neither offered a standard for determining these "outer perimeters"
nor made inquiry 7 into the inherently expressive nature of the
performances. Declining to categorize "an apparently limitless"
variety of conduct as speech, the plurality observed that "[i]t is
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activi-
ty but such a kernel is not sufficient [to implicate] the First
Amendment.
58
The plurality's classification of the dancing as symbolic
speech was a crucial part of its opinion because it resulted in the
application of the weak59 O'Brien test under which Indiana was
permitted to totally suppress the performances. By summarily re-
jecting a determination of inherently expressive conduct,6° the plu-
rality avoided confronting the communicative nature of the dancing
and made it clear that non-traditional speech, i.e., expressive con-
duct, even if historically protected by precedent as the performanc-
es at issue were, do not to trigger full First Amendment protection.
By qualifying the dancing as being on the "outer perimeters of
56. Id. at 2460.
57. See also Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1090-98 (7th Cir.
1990) (Posner, J., concurring).
58. Barnes, III S. Ct. at 2462 (quoting Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)
and citing United States v. O'Bnen, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
59. See id at 2460-61; supra text accompanying notes 27-35.
60. The plurality could have applied the Spence communicative intent/likelihood of
understanding test for non-inherently expressive conduct but did not even mention it,
preferring to assume that the dancing implicated -some" First Amendment protection,
wluch could be easily surmounted by Indiana's police power under the O'Brien test. See
Barnes, III S. Ct. at 2460, 2462; Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)
Had the plurality tested the performances under the Spence test, it would have had to
recognize the dancer's intent to communicate and the likelihood that her audience would
understand her "erotic message," as Justice Rehnquist refers to it. Barnes, IIl S. Ct. at
2463; supra note 25 and text accompanying note 26.
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the First Amendment but only marginally so,"6" the plurality
applied a lesser quality of protection to dancing than prior cases
seemed to require.2 The plurality further avoided contact with the
commumcative nature of nude dancing by ignoring cases which
support the proposition that entertainment is protected speech be-
cause it involves the commumcation of ideas.63 By giving no rea-
son for its departure from settled precedent m the classification of
dancing, the Barnes plurality legitimized an exclusive focus on
conduct, and not commumcation, in the crucial first step of First
Amendment analysis speech classification.' This approach substi-
tutes assertion for proof and avoids the core question concerning
any alleged First Amendment activity- does the activity involve
communication? The Barnes plurality, by focusing exclusively on
the element of conduct, which is present in every form of speech,
encourages courts to "categorize an apparently limitless variety" of
speech as conduct, thereby leading to "reduced" or non-existent
First Amendment protection.
Justice White, writing for the dissent, adopted a contrary view
of the performances, which he saw as possessing the power to
generate thoughts, ideas, and emotions.65 This power, he stated, is
the essence of communication." Nudity, explained Justice White,
is not merely conduct, but a "distinctive expressive component" of
a nude dancing performance. 67 Because the State applied its stat-
ute to prohibit all activity containing this expressive component,
Justice Wute reasoned, the State was regulating content, thus invit-
ing strict First Amendment scrutiny of the statute as applied.68
61. Barnes, I11 S. Ct. at 2460.
62. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972). See supra text
accompanying note 21.
63. See Zacclum v. Scnpps-Howard Broadcasting, 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (entertain-
ment in form of film of human cannonball deserving First Amendment protection);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 207-12 (1975) (drive-rn theater film
portraying nudity). See also supra text accompanying note 19.
64. See Barnes Il1 S. Ct. at 2461; O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
65. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2474 (White, J., dissenting).
66. IR
67. Id. (citing "the thoughtful concurrng opinion" of Judge Posner in Miller v. Civil
City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1090-98 (7th Cir. 1990)). Justice White cited Aris-
totle as casting light on the expressive nature of the dancing performances. IcL at 2471-72
n.l. "Rhythm alone, without harmony, is the means of the dancer's imitations; for even
he, by the rhythms of his attitudes, may represent men's characters, as well as what they
do and suffer." ARISTOTLE, PoETIcs 223 (Modem Library ed., I. Bywater Itr. 1954).
68. Barnes, Il S. Ct. at 2474 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1989)
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The plurality's approach to speech classification could allow a
contraction of First Amendment protection. Because conduct, by
definition, is inherent in everything we do, the conduct/expression
dichotomy could be instrumental in restricting First Amendment
freedoms in non-nude dancing contexts.69 Barnes's conduct-inten-
sive focus allows legislatures to select conduct as the significant
element in regulating other 'expressions.' For example, flag burning
and flag defacement scenarios involve conduct-intensive fact sce-
nanos and ample opportumty for the Court to invoke a lesser level
of First Amendment protection for the activities on the basis of
conduct.
70
In the past, the Court did not invoke a lesser level of protec-
tion for these conduct-intensive scenarios. Perhaps the fact that
these cases involved political, not sexual, speech, can explain
Barnes's lack of inquiry into the communicative aspects of First
Amendment activity Such a distinction, however, is based on
content, and content suppression is supposed to be strictly prohibit-
ed. 71 Barnes, however, allows a circumvention of this most basic
First Amendment command, resulting in the avoidance of strict
scrutiny72 and use of the legislature-friendly O'Brien test.
73
B. "Time, Place, or Manner" As "Never, Nowhere, No Way"
After establishing a conduct-intensive method of speech classi-
fication, the plurality set out to apply the O'Brien test, but first
modified the time, place, or manner test, laying the groundwork for
and Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). Under strict scrutiny, a judicial assessment
of the artistic merits of the nude dancing performances is not to be a determining factor.
Id at 2474-75 (quoting Cohen v. Califorma, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ('[I]t is largely
because government officials cannot make principled decisions in this area that the Consti-
tution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.") (Harlan, J.)).
69. It is difficult to imagine any type of expression that does not contain some ele-
ment of conduct since the mind, which formulates an idea, and the body, which expresses
it, are part of the same unit, an individual. Since the plurality offered no standard to
determne the extent of protection to be accorded to differing types of conduct, the ratio-
nal citizen would probably conclude that the safest forms of expressive conduct are either
manual - writing or text - or vocal - speech.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Eichmann, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (flag burning).
71. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; Boos, 485 U.S. at 321; Spence v. Washmglon, 418
U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). See also supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
72. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 321; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 & n.7 (1980);
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 98-99 (1972).
73. See generally Donald Ayer, Right Makes Might: Laying Down the Law at the
Supreme Court, The Rehnquist Court Unbound, CONN. L. TRIB., July 29, 1991, at Al
(discussing the conservative Justices' deference to state governmental processes).
1112 [Vol. 42:1103
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a broader application of government speech prohibitions with a
corresponding relaxation of the burden governments must carry to
justify speech prohibitions.74 Although the plurality overtly de-
clined to apply a TPM test to the statute, it observed that tlus test
had been applied to conduct on private property, that the test
"embod[ied] much the same standards" as the O'Bnen symbolic
speech test, and thus the O'Brien test should be used.75
The O'Brien test is quite different from the TPM test m that
it can sanction total prohibitions of expressive conduct. No "ade-
quate alternative channels of commumcation" 76 need be made
available under O'Brien. Rather, the prohibition need only be "no
greater than essential" to the furtherance of a substantial govern-
ment interest." Therefore, a total prohibition on First Amendment
expression may be deemed "no greater than essential." Need, which
can be easily created, becomes an operative factor.
The plurality's comparison of the time, place, or manner test
with the symbolic speech test is curious. Applying both tests to the
same scenario could mandate distinctly different outcomes. These
tests, however, can be harmomzed if the O'Brien test is seen as
modifying the TPM test. If a total prohibition78 under O'Brien is
deemed to be no greater than essential to further a government
interest, then the alternative channels of commumcation which must
be left open according to the TPM test can only be adequate if
"alternative channels" refers to qualitatively alternative messages.
Yet, a qualitatively alternative message is still an alternative
message.79 Nonetheless, the plurality and Justice Souter categorize
the total prohibition on the communication of eroticism via nudity
as only quantitatively moderating the performances' "erotic mes-
sage.98
0
74. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
75. Id The Court did not, however, go so far as to expressly equate the two tests.
76. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 (1981); supra note 46
and accompanying text.
77. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; see supra text accompanying note 29.
78. In this case, a total prohibition means no erotic thoughts communicated via nudity.
79. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
462-63 & n.7 (1980); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 98-99 (1972).
See also supra text accompanying notes 37-46.
80. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463 (Mhe [prohibition] does not deprive the dance
of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less
grapluc.') (Rehnquist, CJ.); id. at 2471 ("[T]he limitation is minor when measured against
the dancer's remaining capacity and opportunity to express the erotic message) (Souter,
J.).
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Tis characterization allows the government to mandate the
suppression of any specific message under the guise of "merely"
diluting that message. For example, the phrase at issue in Cohen v.
California, "Fuck The Draft," is qualitatively distinct from the
ideologically similar phrase, "The Draft is Bad."8t The impact
with which an idea is communicated can clearly change the mean-
mg of the commumcation. Similarly, the communication of eroti-
cism via nudity and the communication of eroticism via "pasties
and a G-string" relay distinct messages. Barnes's comparison of the
TPM and O'Brien tests results in a synthesized symbolic speech
("SSS") test. This synthesized test suggests that total qualitative
prohibitions provide an adequate alternative channel of commumca-
tion. Logically, this result is absurd. 82 Legally, it means that states
may legislate prohibitions of symbolic commumcation on increas-
mgly diverse bases. 3
The second consequence of the plurality's synthesis of the
time, place, and manner test with the O'Brien test is an increase in
the number of places where states can suppress symbolic communi-
cation. By noting that the TPM test had been applied to conduct
occurring on private property in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres,4 the plurality may have been, if not opening a door, at
least opening a window, to a much larger role for that test.85 Al-
though it did observe that the TPM test has been traditionally
applied to conduct taking place in a public forum like a street or a
public park, the plurality proceeded to modify by implication the
"adequate alternative channels of communication" element of the
test by positive comparison to the O'Brien symbolic speech test. 6
Given the reasoning that both tests "embody the same stan-
dards," that the TPM test has been applied to private property,
along with the application of the symbolic speech test to private
property in Barnes, it would not be irrational for future courts to
view Barnes as an invitation to further extend hybrid TPM analy-
81. See 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971).
82. See Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 615, 650-54 (1991) (questioning the wisdom of a trend towards collapsing
the time, place and manner and symbolic conduct tests).
83. See generally Robert Giuffra, Jr., Romancing The Rehnquist Court, MANHATTAN
LAW., Nov. 1991, 39, 40 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's elevation of federalism as
a constitutional value).
84. 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986).
85. See Barnes, 11l S. Ct. at 2460.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
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Sis8 7 to private property In Renton, the TPM regulations upheld
provided for adequate locationally alternative channels of commum-
cation and did not effect total qualitative prohibitions.8" However,
after Barnes's synthesis of the TPM and O'Brien analyses, if the
TPM test is applied to private property, the O'Brien symbolic
speech test would be available to influence the outcome. Under the
plurality's synthesized symbolic speech test, the complete absence
of alternative channels of commumcation can be considered ade-
quate. After Barnes, states possess the power to legislate total
prohibitions of an individual's symbolic commumcations wherever
the SSS test applies, be it public or private property 9
C. Private Moral Preference, Public Legal Effect
Because the O'Brien test may sanction total prohibitions on
forms of expression, the governmental interest advanced to justify
the prohibition must be sufficiently important, i.e., "compelling [or]
substantial." 9 On its own initiative, the Barnes plurality advanced
a theoretically possible interest that will serve as a powerful jus-
tification for future prohibitions.9" Unlike Justice Souter and the
dissent, who saw the State's goal in applying the statute as the
deterrence of crime and other anti-social activities,92 the plurality
simply ignored Indiana's proffered interest for suppressing nude
dancing performances.
Citing the lack of legislative history associated with the Indi-
ana statute, the plurality undertook an historical examination of
"public indecency" laws and concluded that Indiana's prohibition
"reflect[s] moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude
among strangers in public places" and was "designed to protect
morals and public order."93 The dissent was alone in placing em-
phasis on the fact that the statute was not applied to plays, ballets,
or operas containing public nudity despite the asserted constancy of
87. This hybnd test would take the form of the synthesized symbolic speech test.
88. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46.
89. See generally Charles Rothfeld, Federalis's Smoking Guns, LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
30, 1991, at 34 (criticizing the Supreme Court's deference preference).
90. See Barnes, III S. Ct. at 2461 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376). Although the
words 'compelling" and -substantial" interest seem like the language of strict scrutiny,
O'Brien analysis is in fact much weaker. See supra notes 27-46 and accompanying text.
91. Barnes, III S. Ct. at 2461-62.
92. Id. at 2473.
93. Id at 2461-62.
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the state interest in "promoting societal order and morality "'
By striking out on its own to locate an important government
interest to satisfy the government interest prong of O'Brien, the
plurality may have been expressing the same willingness to accord
deference to legislative bodies with respect to control over individ-
ual sexual morality as it did in Bowers v. Hardwick.9 5 Indiana
had not sought deference on such a metaphysical basis. Further,
unlike the government interest in O'Brien, which stemmed from no
less than Congress's express power to raise armies under the Con-
stitution," the state interest in "promoting morality" as located by
the Barnes plurality, is derived from the police power, a power no-
where mentioned in the Constitution.97 The plurality's investiga-
tion of the history of public indecency statutes may constitute
additional evidence of a Bowers-type willingness to defer to a
legislature's determination of a universally correct moral choice by
drawing on a very large pool of potential justifications.
By tracing the offense of public nudity through seventeenth
century English common law, back to the "story of Adam and
Eve," the plurality may have been suggesting that potential sources
for these moral justifications are neither exclusively American nor
solely legal in nature.9 The promotion of a religious system of
morality, however, could lead to arbitrary schemes of enforcement
of the type previously struck down for vagueness.99
Further, reliance on a notion of public morality, especially a
notion so intrinsically related to religious definitions, treads threat-
94. Id at 2472-73 (White, J., dissenting).
95. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding a prohibition on private homosexual sodomy
enacted solely "on the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate that homo-
sexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable"); Barnes, 1II S. Ct. at 2462, 2465.
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cli. 12, 14.
97. See 11I S. Ct. at 2461-62; see also NOWAK et al., supra note 3, § 8.2 at 263-64.
98. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461. By means of its Biblical allusion, the plurality
may have been suggesting an ultimate influence for Judaeo-Chnstian beliefs, if only
through the back door of a majority of voter-believers influencing their elected representa-
tives to adopt a Judaeo-Chnstian approach to sexual morality. The garden myth is a cen-
tral feature of what one judge in the case below had referred to as "our Judaeo-Chnstian
heritage." Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1105, 1106 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Coffey, J., dissenting) ("I am not one who believes that the federal courts
[should] establish a secular moral view that contributes to the piece-by-piece disman-
tling of our historic Judaeo-Chnstian principles and heritage.-)
99. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-59
(1988) ("[I]n the area of free expression a licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in
the hands of a government official or agency constitutes a pnor restraint and may result
in censorship."). See also supra note 35.
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eningly near the concept of religious freedom. As Judge Learned
Hand has observed, "[t]he First Amendment gives no one the
right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities."1°° The
effect of the plurality's elevation of a legislative majority's views
on sexual morality to the status of "important government interest"
under O'Brien is to enhance the power of states to determine the
range of an individual's essentially private moral choices.'
D. The First Amendment: Symbol of Sacrifice?
By permitting Indiana's prohibition based on a morality inter-
est derived from the "traditional police power of the States" to
"provide for the public morals,"'1 2 the plurality altered
the strength of the traditional adversary of individual rights, creat-
ing a greater potential for future dilutions of those rights. As the
plurality correctly observed, the police power to promote public
morality has been upheld as a basis for legislation in prior cas-
es.' 03 However, these cases, unlike Barnes, did not involve any
fundamental right. Roth v. United States, the leading obscenity
case, stands for the proposition that the First Amendment does not
protect obscenity; 1°4 Parts Adult Theatre I v. Slaton stands for
the proposition that the public display of obscemty may be prohib-
ited despite the consenting nature of adult viewers;0 5 Bowers v.
Hardwick upheld a prohibition on homosexual sodomy, which was
not regarded as a fundamental right.16
Under Gitlow v. New York, freedom of expression, which
includes nude dancing performed as entertainment, is a fundamental
right made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 7 Justifications forged in the context of obscenity jurispru-
dence do not carry the same weight in the fundamental right con-
text. As the Court noted: "Freedom of press, freedom of speech,
100. Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953).
101. See generally Anita L Allen, Court Disables Disputed Legacy Of Privacy Right,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13 1990, at 58 (categonzing the Rehnquist Court's philosophy of legis-
lative deference as a means to disable a "controversial jurisprudence of fundamental con-
stitutional privacy").
102. Barnes, 11 I S. Ct. at 2462.
103. d
104. See 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); supra note 17 and accompanying text.
105. See 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973).
106. See 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
107. 268 U.S. 652, 665 (1925).
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freedom of religion are in a preferred position."'0 8 The Barnes
plurality's balancing of the States' essentially plenary police power
against an express constitutional command informing the fundamen-
tal right of free expression subjects the First Amendment, a limit
on government power, to the relatively unrestrained whims of state
legislative majorities. t"
E. Secondary Effects: Race to the Bottom?
Justice Souter's view of the important government interest
satisfying O'Brien's second prong, which differed substantially
from the plurality's, t t would provide states with another power-
ful justification for enforcing speech prohibitions. Echoing Indiana's
position, he concluded that the interest advanced by the state's
application of the statute to nude dancing performances was the
deterrence of the "pernicious secondary effects" associated with the
dancing such as "prostitution, criminal activity, and other
activities which break down family structure "M The gov-
ernent need not await "localized proof of those effects" before
acting to prevent them;'1 2 instead, it may rely on the legislative
and administrative findings of other municipalities to reasonably
conclude that the dancing is "likely to produce" the negative sec-
ondary effects." 3
Justice Souter then concluded that the government interest in
deterring these secondary effects was unrelated to the suppression
of free expression, thus satisfying O'Brien's third prong. Justice
Souter argued that the "association" between the nude dancing
establishments and the evil sought to be eradicated did not neces-
sarily mean that the evil was caused by the persuasiveness of the
"expression inherent in the dancing.""' 4 Rather, he explained, a
108. Murdock v. Pennsylvama, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). See also NOWAK et al., supra
note 3, § 16.7(a) at 837-38.
109. See generally Donald Ayer, The Path of Restraint; Conservative Court Exerts Its
Will By Not Interfering With the Political Decisions of the Legislative and Executive
Branches, THE RECORDER, Aug. 8, 1991, at 4 (discussing the Rehnquist Court's deference
to legislative bodies).
110. See supra section IV.C.
111. Barnes, III S. Ct. at 2473 (Souter, J., concumng).
112. ld at 2469-70 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 44
(1986); Young v. Amencan Mina Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 & n.34 (1976); Califor-
nia v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 111 (1972)).
113. See id. at 2469, 2470 (citations omitted).
114. lid at 2470.
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conclusion that a locus of expressive activity is associated with
certain secondary effects simply indicates the existence of a corre-
lation between the locus and the effects without deciding "what the
precise causes of the correlation actually are."115
The secondary effects rationale employed by Justice Souter,
like the plurality's morality rationale," 6 affords states a broad
new range of potential justifications with which to satisfy the gov-
ernment interest prong of O'Brien. Where the plurality would ex-
amine chronologically, geographically, and metaphysically distant,
to find support for a State's morality interest,"7 Justice Souter
would regard the experiences and findings of any American mumc-
ipality as presumptively valid in a determination of the non-causal
link between a particular expressive activity and negative secondary
effects. However, as Justice White, writing for the dissent ob-
served, "[i]f Justice Souter is correct that there is no causal con-
nection between the message conveyed by the nude dancing at
issue here and the negative secondary effects that the State desires
to regulate, the State does not have even a rational basis for its
absolute prohibition on nude dancing that is admittedly
expressive."",is
In addition, the Renton presumptive effect analysis relied on
by Justice Souter was forged in the context of speech forum relo-
cations, i.e., classic time, place, or manner regulations, not total
qualitative prohibitions as in Barnes."9 In Renton, the Court up-
held a zorung ordinance which merely concentrated theaters show-
ing non-obscene films.' The lowered level of "localized proof"
was justified by a correspondingly lower First Amendment stake,
due to the adequate alternative channels of communication.' 2 '
Justice Souter's substitution of legislative edict for "localized
proof' could encourage future government litigants to engage in a
115. Id
116. See supra section IV.C.
117. See Barnes, 11I S. Ct. at 2459-60; supra section IV.C.
118. Id at 2474 n.2.
119. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986).
120. Id. at 51.
121. See id. at 51-52; American Mira-Theatres at 427 U.S. 50, 70-72 (1976) (finding
that city's interest in preserving quality of its neighborhoods supports ordinance dictating
the dispersion of adult, but non-obscene, theaters in light of lowered First Amendment
stake attending simple relocation of theaters without regard to content); NOWAK et al.,
supra note 3, § 16.61(d) at 1024. Zoning, unlike the absolute prohibition on the commu-
mcation of eroticism via nudity in Barnes, specifically creates alternative channels of
communication for an expressive activity.
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nationwide search for a finding of causality made by other govern-
mental entities who possess the power and the will to "discover"
such causality by fiat. Such an incentive could lead to a reduction
of the empirical validity of the causal relationship between alleged
negative secondary effects and the totally prohibited expressive
conduct.
Correlation analysis, the second important component of Jus-
tice Souter's opinion, constitutes an important new barrier to chal-
lengers of statutory prohibitions on speech. By positing that nega-
tive secondary effects correlated with the presence of the establish-
ments where the expression occurs are unrelated to the inherently
expressive... performances talang place inside those establish-
ments, Justice Souter introduced locus of expression as an opera-
tive factor in the chain of causation calculus under O'Brien's tlurd
prong. The word "correlated" is defined as "closely, systematically,
or reciprocally related."' 23 It is no leap to say that the presence
of nude dancing establishments is directly related to the inherently
expressive performances taking place inside. Because the presence
of the establishments is correlated, i.e. "closely [or] systematically
related" to the negative secondary effects, and the expressive per-
formances are closely related to the establishments themselves, then
the performances are also closely related to those secondary effects.
Thus, a government interest in deterring those secondary effects is
closely related to the expressive performances.
To advance its interest, the government must suppress the
expressive performances that correlate with negative secondary
effects. Logically, the interest is related to the suppression of free
expression, thus failing the third prong of O'Brien.124 Legally, the
locus of expression is substituted for the expression itself as the
object of the prohibition.'25 However, it is an "entire category of
122. Justice Souter is of the opinion that the performances were inherently expressive.
See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468.
123. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY -(1971).
124. Since Justice Souter admits that the nude dancing performances are -inherently
expressive," the chain of causation runs from the performances, to the presence of the
establishments to the negative secondary effects alleged by the State. See Barnes, III S.
Ct. at 2468. Accordingly, under Justice Souter's own terms, the prohibition of an inherent-
ly expressive activity to combat pernicious secondary effects fails the third O'Brien prong
because the asserted state interest in combatting crime is directly related to the suppres-
sion of an inherently expressive activity.
125. A focus on the locus of expression makes sense in cases
like Renton and American Mini-Theatres which involved ordinances
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expression,"' 26 the nude dancing performances, which are totally
prohibited, not the locus of expression as in Renton or American
Mini Theatres.t1 2  Under Justice Souter's correlation analysis,
states are essentially immune from an attack under the third prong
of O'Brien because of the extreme difficulty of determining wheth-
er a speech prohibition is related or merely "correlated" to the sup-
pression of free expression.
t21
F Conclusion
In Barnes, the plurality and Justice Souter weakened the mdi-
vidual right to free expression in seven concrete ways. First, by
focusing exclusively on conduct and ignoring the commniumcative
nature of expressive activity, the plurality legitimized the arbitrary
classification of even speech protected by precedent as "mere ex-
pressive conduct" and thus subject to a lesser degree of First
Amendment protection.129 Second, by equating symbolic speech
and "time, place, or manner" analysis, the plurality synthesized a
new symbolic speech test which gutted time, place, or manner
analysis' stricter "adequate alternative channels of commumcation"
requirement, allowing total qualitative prohibitions on expression to
be deemed to be "no greater than essential."' 30
Third, by equating symbolic speech and time, place, or man-
ner analysis to synthesize a new symbolic speech test, observing
that time, place, or manner analysis has been applied to conduct
occurring on private property, and applying the new test to private
regulating permissible speech forums, but is inapposite in Barnes
where a prohibition, rather than a relocation of speech was at issue.
Although Justice Souter focused on the location of the expression,
his ammus towards the nude dancing performances was obvious,
surfacing in such comments as "society's interest in [this expres-
sion] is of a lesser magnitude " and that "sexually explicit
expression may be of lesser societal importance "Barnes, 111
S. Ct. at 2470-71.
126. Id. at 2475.
127. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48, 52 (1986); Young
v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 82 n.4 (1976).
128. See generally Charles Rothfeld, Right Makes Might, Laying Down the Law at the
Supreme Court, Federalism Redux: Spotlight on the States, CONN. L. TRIB., July 29,
1991, at A12 (noting the "extraordinary range of cases" in which the Court's conservative
majority invoked the doctrine of federalism to defer to state courts and legislatures).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 58-73.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 74-83.
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property, the plurality opened a window to further expansion of the
symbolic speech test to private property "'1 Fourth, by allowing
the implied and open-ended police power to promote public moral-
ity to outweigh the fundamental individual right of free speech, the
plurality restricted the range of essentially private communications
available to individuals. 32 Fifth, by elevating the promotion of
public morality by legislative majorities to the status of governmen-
tal interest capable of informing a prohibition on speech, the plu-
rality injected a heavy dose of arbitrariness into the body of First
Amendment jurisprudence. 33
Sixth, by employing a "secondary effects" analysis premised
on the presumptive validity of legislatively-issued findings in the
First Amendment context, Justice Souter opened the door to a
diminution of the empirical validity of the interests advanced to
justify empirically absolute suppressions of expressive activity 134
Seventh, by positing locus of expression, rather than prohibited
expression itself, as determinative of the cause of the secondary
effects sought to be eradicated by a statutory prohibition, Justice
Souter creates a scheme of analysis under which the government
would almost always prevail over the individual.
1 35
V APPLICATION OF BARNES
Barnes has already had an effect upon a wide variety of
speech cases. In the thirteen cases citing the decision, only four
have involved nude dancing performed as entertainment. In those
four, the decision has been construed as according a lesser degree
of First Amendment protection to the "expressive aspect of nude
dancing; 1 ' as an example of the continuing viability of the
131. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77, 84-89.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 102-09.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 110-21.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 110-28.
136. See, e.g., D.G. Restaurant Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 953 F.2d 140, 143 (4th
Cir. 1991) (citing Barnes as a general example of the application of a lesser degree of
First Amendment protection to physical conduct as compared to "purer modes of commu-
mcative speech" and as a specific example of the Supreme Court according less than ful
First Amendment protection to "the expressive aspect of nude dancing"); International Eat-
enes of America, Inc. v. Broward County, Fla., 941 F.2d 1157, 1159-61 (11th Cir. 1991)
(noting Justice Rehnquist's reduced protection of dancing despite precedential treatment,
and deciding to apply the Renton secondary effects test to the ordinance at issue in light
of Justice Souter's conclusion that control of secondary effects was a substantial govern-
ment interest under the second prong of O'Brien); Lee v. City of Newport, 947 F.2d 945,
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Renton secondary effects test in the zoning context; and as support-
mg the proposition that nude dancing is a protected form of
speech. In the commercial speech context, the Justice White's
dissent has been cited as supporting the requirement that content-
based restrictions be narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling
governmental interest.1
37
In the reproductive rights arena, an abortion protest case has
cited Barnes as involving time, place, or manner analysis; 38 an-
other abortion case referred to the decision as an example of the
application of the O'Brien symbolic speech test. t39 Barnes has
been cited in an attorney "gag rule" case as involving speech that
is a direct target of a statutory prohibition; t4° in a flag display
case as forbidding the application of an ordinance to suppress
expressive conduct precisely because of its commumcative at-
tributes;' 4' and in a "hate speech" case as a decision involving
the application of a statute to regulate conduct, not content.1
42
In the military justice context, Barnes has been interpreted as
supporting the prohibition of "immoral" activities without regard to
their offensive character; 43 as an example of the proper applica-
945 n.4 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that in Barnes, "the Supreme Court held that nude
dancing is not unprotected expression").
137. See Discovery Network, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 946 F.2d 464, 473 (6th Cir.
1991) (citing Barnes dissent for proposition that content based restrictions will be upheld
only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest constitutional
challenge to city ordinance bannung the distribution of commercial handbills on city streets
due to aesthetic and safety reasons).
138. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 62 (3d Cir.
1991) (challenge to constitutionality of injunctive restrictions placed on speech of abortion
protesters upheld with one narrow exception).
139. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 691
(3d Cir. 1991) (challenging to the constitutionality of Pennsylvania abortion statute).
140. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, III S. Ct. 2720, 2724 (1991) (distinguishing
Barnes as a case involving speech as a direct target of the statute in question).
141. See Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 1991 WL 288827 at *2 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(citing Justice Scalia s concumng opinion in Barnes for the proposition that if the City
sought to prohibit the expressive conduct, flag display, precisely because of its commum-
cative attributes, the ordinance would be found unconstitutional).
142. See Iota XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University, 773
F.Supp. 792, 793-94 (E.D.Va. 1991) (reviewing discipline imposed on fraternity members
who had sponsored what George Mason University administrators considered to be a so-
cially offensive contest involving the performance of "ugly woman" and blackface skits
and finding sanctions unconstitutional because they punished expression).
143. See Umted States v. Hall, 1991 WL 244298 *9 n.13 (A.C.M.R. 1991) (citing
Barnes to as example of continuing judicial maintenance of the prohibition on consensual
sodomy, specifically quoting Justice Scalia's concurring opinion to the effect that society
prohibits a range of activities not because they harm others, but because the are consid-
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tion of the symbolic speech test;'" and as supporting the propo-
sition that nudity alone, even in the presence of others, does not
"in and of itself' constitute a crime.
145
So'?
While Barnes has been cited in a number of cases, it is im-
portant to note that states have not taken advantage of the wider
latitude seemingly offered them. Yet, in the few months since its
publication, Barnes, true to its nature as a First Amendment case,
has served to inform a range of opimons united by a "golden
thread" of commumcation. Few of the cases citing Barnes seem to
demand an immediate manning of the barricades, perhaps because
none have involved total prohibitions on commuication like
Barnes did. This situation is fortunate, but, like fortune, a product
of accident, not design.
In light of the seven ways Barnes strengthens legislative pow-
er to suppress fundamental rights of expression,'" it is easy to
imagine Barnes being used to justify scenarios fundamentally at
odds with the letter and the spirit of the First Amendment. The
secondary-effect driven area of sexually explicit speech and the
morality-charged area of "hate speech" appear most likely to attract
an application of Barnes.
47
Justice Souter's secondary effects/correlation analysis could
easily find resonance in the book- and film-banning context. Under
his analysis, any legislature could make a legislative finding that
the locus of the sale or showing of sexually explicit materials was
correlated to a rise in crime, thus allowing the legislature to "inci-
dentally" yet totally prohibit the sale of certain works. The prohibi-
tion would not be related to the suppression of free expression
because the analysis would focus on the locus of sale or display,
not the commumcative aspects of the works.
ered contra bono mores, or immoral).
144. See United States v. Wilson, 33 M.J. 797, 799-800 (A.C.M.R. 1991) (citing Barnes
as example of the application of O'Brien test in challenge to soldier's conviction for
disobedience and dereliction of duty for blowing his nose on flag while member of a
flag-ratsing detail based on allegation that the punished act was a form of expressive
conduct and thus protected by the First Amendment).
145. See United States v. Choate, 32 M.J. 423, 427 (C.M.A. 1991) (soldier's conviction
for exposing of buttocks to fellow soldier's wife).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 129-35; see also supra section IV
147. Other areas of potential application might include abortion protest, abortion infor-
mation, education, choice of lifestyle, environmentalism and commercial speech.
1124 [Vol. 42:1103
BARNES v.-GLEN THEATRE
By relying on the presumed validity of various and sundry
legislative findings, the government could avoid the issue of cause
and effect altogether and would not even have to show a rational
basis for its prohibition. The only brake on tins scenario would be
prudential, based on the political value of a prohibition to its sup-
porters. In many areas of the country, that political value would be
high."' If sexually explicit commumcation is of lesser societal
value, as Justice Souter assures us,149 its packaging in book or
film formats will not save it from the censor. Further, a sexually
explicit material exception to the First Amendment could be ex-
tended to the realm of political thought. Crime, again, could be
advanced as the secondary effect of bookstores selling books advo-
cating an activist strategy to secure political change."s
The main problem with a legislative assessment of the relative
worth of ideas is that it is informed by a single dangerous princi-
ple, arbitrariness. The Barnes secondary effects analysis which
neither provides for alternative channels of communication nor
requires a cause and effect relationship between the prohibited
conduct and the interest advanced to justify the prohibition serves
to inflict the arbitrary edicts of legislative majorities on a range of
commumcations "limted" only by the plenary power of the legisla-
ture. Content suppression will be the primary effect of Justice
Souter's secondary effects/correlation analysis.
The Barnes plurality's establishment of morality as a factor
justifying speech prohibition will continuously beg the thorny ques-
tion, whose morality? Our system of representative government,
absent a Constitution limiting the power of the majority, would
result in those groups with the loudest and most persistent voices
getting things done their way at the expense of that smallest of
minorities, the individual. Absent judicial enforcement of federal
constitutional rights, the same result ensues. If morality limits the
Limiter, i.e., the Constitution, what limits morality9 Barnes implies
that legislative majorities can morally decide on a morality for all
individuals. The wisdom of this policy may be tested in the "hate
speech" context,1 where majorities must choose values inform-
148. See Ken Terry, Industry Prepares to Fight Proposed 'Sex Offender' Bill, BILL-
BOARD, at 4, June 8, 1991 (noting free speech groups' efforts to combat U.S. Senate bill
that would allow victims of sex crinmes to sue producers, distributors, and sellers of sex-
ually explicit, though not obscene, materials).
149. See Barnes, III S. Ct. at 2470.
150. E.g., KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1848).
151. See Deborah Ellis, Hate Speech Is Still Protected Speech, N.J.L.J., Dec. 9, 1991, at
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ing the morality they wish to promote via campus hate speech
codes.'52
Under Barnes, hate speech could easily be recast as involving
a "fighting words" element analogous to conduct, thus tnggerng
the weak symbolic speech test. The main question under the
plurality's analysis would be the question of what morality interest
informs a prohibition on "hateful expressive conduct." By shielding
the leaders of tomorrow from the psychological and emotional
harm presumed to flow from conduct "found" to be socially detri-
mental to "captive" audiences, the majority chooses paternalism
over personal responsibility t' By purporting to eliminate unpop-
ular thought by force, the majority chooses power over reason as a
universal justification.'54 By compelling adherence to an ortho-
doxy, the majority chooses obedience over autonomy as a badge of
human decency t' Most importantly, by arbitrarily imposing pun-
ishment for disagreement, the majority chooses group rights over
individual rights.
Will the "beneficiaries" of hate speech codes become psycho-
logically whole individuals or will they seek a Hitler9 Assuming
that morality consists of discerning the difference between good
and evil and choosing the good, the inherent contradiction of a
morality interest informing a prohibition on expression is that the
morality interest is immoral because it destroys individual choice.
Under the guise of deference, the Barnes decision gives legislatures
16 ((1) noting the irony that the command of the First Amendment only becomes nec-
essary when the majority views speech as disagreeable; (2) quoting Justice Holmes, "We
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe and believe to be fraught with death," and noting that attempts to censor unpopular
opinions arose in 1920s, to muzzle labor organizers and anti-war protesters, in the 1960s,
to suppress the message of civil rights workers; and, (3) observing that absent Justice
Brennan's decision in New York Tites v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 274 (1967), which subjected
libel law to the Constitution, that the civil rights revolution in the South may not have
been as zealously reported).
152. See Daniel Harris, Whose Culture Is It Anyway?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992, Book
Review Section, at 3 (review of DEBATING P.C. - THE CONTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL
CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES (Paul Berman ed. 1992)) (discussing the rise of
"well-intentioned yet ill-advised" efforts by universities to promote a political orthodoxy
on campus and criticizing article by Professor Stanley Fish, "There's No Such Thing As
Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too" as constructing a "fraudulent intellectual ratio-
nale for censorship").
153. See Ronald J. Riccio, Free Speech v. Freedon frot Bigotry, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30,
1991, Outside Counsel Section at I (citing reasons to support campus speech codes).
154. See id
155. See id.
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a blank check to control content in communication for all. What a
blatant violation of the Constitution! The First Amendment was
specifically enacted to guarantee each individual's right to make
speech-content decisions without such political interference.
TIMOTHY M. TESLUK

